EU Enlargement and the Internal Geography of Countries by Crozet, Matthieu & Koenig, Pamina
EU Enlargement and the Internal Geography of
Countries
Matthieu Crozet, Pamina Koenig
To cite this version:
Matthieu Crozet, Pamina Koenig. EU Enlargement and the Internal Geography of Countries.
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, 2004, 32 (2), pp.265-279. <halshs-00096821>
HAL Id: halshs-00096821
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00096821
Submitted on 20 Sep 2006
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
EU Enlargement and industrial relocation within the CEECs ∗
Matthieu Crozet† Pamina Koenig-Soubeyran ‡
∗We wish to thank Constantin Zaman and Mathilde Maurel for providing data
†TEAM, University of Paris I and CNRS, 106-112 Bd de l’hoˆpital 75647 PARIS CEDEX 13, France.
Email: crozet@univ-paris1.fr
‡CREST and TEAM, University of Paris I and CNRS, timbre J360, 15 blvd Gabriel Pe´ri, 92245 Malakoff
Cedex, France. Email: pks@ensae.fr
1
This paper focuses on the relation between trade openness and the location of economic
activity in a country. The problematic lies in the context of the EU enlargement process and of
its impact on the location of economic activity inside each of the accessing countries. We develop
a new economic geography model based on the original Krugman (1991) model, and show that
trade liberalization will foster agglomeration of economic activity in the location that has the
lowest-cost access to foreign markets. Our results thus differ from Krugman and Livas’s (1996)
conclusions. We expect the CEECs’ economies to shift economic activity towards EU markets.
We provide empirical evidence of this result focusing on the post-1991 Romanian urban system.
Keywords: economic integration, urban concentration, agglomeration, CEECs
Ce papier se donne pour objectif d’analyser les conse´quences du processus d’e´largissement
de l’Union Europe´enne sur la localisation des activite´s au sein des pays d’Europe Centrale et
Orientale . Nous de´veloppons pour cela un mode`le d’e´conomie ge´ographique, dans la ligne´e des
travaux de Krugman (1991) et Krugman et Livas (1996). Pourtant les conclusions the´oriques
que nous mettons en e´vidence s’opposent clairement celles obtenues par Krugman et Livas
(1996). On montre en effet que l’ouverture au commerce peut engendrer un renforcement des
dynamiques d’agglomration au sein des pays participant l’e´change. Plus encore, l’ouverture
devrait, dans certains cas, favoriser davantage les zones urbaines offrant le meilleur acce`s aux
marche´s e´trangers. Dans la dernie`re section de l’article, une analyse empirique centre´e sur les
dynamiques des re´gions roumaines depuis 1991 vient soutenir ces conclusions.
Mots Cle´s : inte´gration e´conomique, concentration urbaine, agglome´ration, PECO
J.E.L. Classification: F12, F15, R12
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EU Enlargement and industrial relocation within the CEECs
1 Introduction
The perspective of the enlargement of the European Union (EU) to the Central and Eastern
European Countries (CEECs) raises main concern with respect to an eventual reallocation of
factors within the accessing countries: the CEECs are about to integrate a new economic struc-
ture and are, since the dismantling of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon),
significantly overthrown in terms of their trade and production patterns. Therefore, the pre-
accession period and the first years after enlargement will be particularly important in observing
how the CEECs’ economies react to this shock.
The theory of the Optimal Currency Areas (OCA), enunciated by Mundell (1961), defines an
optimal currency area as a set of regions or countries for which the benefits of the monetary union
are larger than the costs. The endogeneity argument highlights that commercially integrated
countries will endogenously develop conditions to form an optimal currency area: increased
trade and diversified economies will favor less asymmetric shocks and thus reduce the costs of
having a fixed exchange rate.
Spatial economy and new economic geography literature (Krugman, 1991; Krugman and
Venables, 1995; Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999) constitute adequate instruments to tackle
the issue of the EU enlargement’s impact on production and trade patterns within the CEECs.
New economic geography models focus on explaining the emergence of endogenous asymmetrical
economic structures. Thus, they represent a very insightful way of analyzing the reaction of
the CEECs’ economies to the reorientation of their trade patterns in terms of relocation of
industries.
In a national framework, Krugman (1991) and Puga (1998) analyze the geographical distri-
bution of economic activity between two regions following an interregional reduction in transport
costs; the former model explains specifically how a change in interregional transport costs can
lead to the agglomeration of economic activity in one of the two cities, and the latter shows
the same phenomenon in a setting incorporating rural-urban migration. Furthermore, and this
will be our focus in this paper, the economic geography of a country can also be analyzed in
an international framework, as show Krugman and Livas (1996)1: they study the impact of
trade liberalization on the spatial distribution of activity inside a country, and conclude that a
country opening to trade will automatically go through a geographical dispersion of its economic
activity.
In this paper, we argue that Krugman and Livas’s result does not apply to all situations:
by choosing a more general framework, we obtain a less extreme result which states that trade
1See also Alonso Villar (1999)
3
liberalization will foster agglomeration of economic activity in the location that has the lowest-
cost access to foreign markets. According to our theoretical results, the more the domestic
country opens its economy to the foreign country, the more the domestic industry will be likely
to locate in regions that facilitate international trade. Thus, when applied to the European
integration process, observing such movements of industry in each of the CEECs would suggest
optimistic conclusions about the endogenous course towards an optimal currency area. On the
contrary, not observing this reallocation of factors could indicate that the country is withdrawing
to itself. In this case it may be that the integration process does not stimulate the country to
a closer participation in forming an optimum currency area.
We propose an empirical application based on the Romanian case. We estimate a simple
relation connecting the increase in urban population and a measure of access to markets. This
allows to assess whether movements of factors towards the western border take place inside the
country since the beginning of the accession negotiations.
In section (2) we expose the theoretical model. We present the basic mechanisms underlying
endogenous relocation of activity in a two countries framework, when the two domestic regions
have the same access to the foreign country. Then, section (3) presents the outcomes of the
model when one of the domestic regions has a better access to international markets. Section
(4) contains the empirical application, and section (5) concludes.
2 The model
The model we develop in this paper is a simple extension of Krugman’s (1991) model to a two
countries framework. At the beginning of our story, the domestic country has no commercial
relations with other countries. We are interested in the spatial distribution of economic activity
inside the domestic country. In autarky, the situation is the one described by the Krugman
(1991) original model: the country develops an economic geography which depends on its in-
ternal market’s characteristics: total agglomeration of the manufacturing sector in one of the
domestic regions is possible if interregional transport costs are not too high.
When the domestic country opens up to trade with the foreign country, the forces driving the
geographic distribution of the increasing returns to scale (IRS) sector change: on the demand
side, there is now a new location to supply, containing a consequent amount of consumers
(foreign manufacturing and service workers). On the supply side, the foreign firms can now
supply the domestic market, enhancing competition for the domestic firms.
We will show different aspects of the impact of trade liberalization on the internal geography
of the domestic country: first, we will see that considering a large foreign country around the
typical two-regions economic geography model greatly affects the outcome of the model, even if
neither the firms nor the consumers are internationally mobile. We will observe that, the larger
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the foreign country, the more the domestic industrial sector will be agglomerated in one of the
regions. Second, we will show that trade liberalization greatly impacts on the internal geography
of the country opening to trade, but not in the way Krugman and Livas (1996)2 conclude.
Indeed, our results imply that trade liberalization fosters urban concentration. Finally, we will
look at how our results are affected by considering two domestic regions which are not located
at the same distance from the foreign market.
2.1 General framework
Consider two countries: a domestic country, containing two regions, labeled 1 and 2, and a
foreign country, labeled 0. There are two sectors: one is a monopolistically competitive manu-
facturing sector M , which produces a differentiated good and stands for all increasing to scale
production activities in the economy. The other is the constant return to scale (CRS), perfectly
competitive sector Z, which produces a homogenous good. We can assimilate it to the service
industries. The two sectors use specific factors. The manufacturing good is traded between the
three regions 0, 1 and 2, while the services good is only traded within the domestic country.
Regional supplies of Z labor are fixed: the three regions contain respectively LZ1, LZ2 and
LZ0 workers in the service industries, which are immobile both interregionally and internation-
ally. Concerning the manufacturing sector, only the total amount of M labor is fixed: the foreign
country is endowed with L0 industrial workers, which are immobile. The domestic country has
L manufacturing workers, distributed among regions: L = L1 +L2. The interregional domestic
distribution of industrial workers is endogenous: manufacturing workers are mobile and migrate
between the two regions 1 and 2, according to the interregional real wage difference.
The spatial framework of the model is introduced through the use of a transport cost variable,
representing distance between cities but also, in a broader sense, barriers to trade. We use an
”iceberg”-type transport cost variable, which means that the transport cost is included in the
quantity of good shipped. When q units are shipped, each priced p, only a proportion q/τ
actually arrives at destination. Therefore, in order for q units to arrive, qτ units have to be
shipped, increasing the price of the q units received to qpτ . Trade in the industrial good bears
transport costs, which differ across regions: τ is the internal transport cost, which applies to
interregional domestic trade, and ρ1 and ρ2 are respectively the external transport costs applying
to each domestic region’s trade with the foreign country. Trade in the service good only occurs
between the two domestic regions and we will assume it is costless, therefore its price equalizes
interregionally: pZ1 = pZ2. More, it is produced under perfect competition, so the price of the
good equals its marginal cost: pZ1 = βZwZ1 and pZ2 = βZwZ2. As a result both wages are
equalized: wZ1 = wZ2 = wZ .
2See also Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), chapter 18.
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Consumers and Price indexes
Every consumer has the same Cobb-Douglas utility function:
U = MµZ1−µ (1)
M is a composite index of the consumption of the manufactured good, Z is the consumption of
services. A share µ of expenditures goes to manufactured goods, and 1−µ to the services. The
composite index M is the following CES function:
M =
[
n∑
i=1
c
σ−1
σ
i
] σ
σ−1
(2)
where ci represents the consumption of a variety i of the manufactured good, and σ is the
elasticity of substitution between two varieties. Given income Ys, each consumer maximizes
his utility under the budget constraint Ys = pZZs +
∑n
i=1 cipis. We get the following demand
function, representing demand emanating from a consumer of region s, addressed to a producer
i located in region r:
ci,rs =
p−σirs∑R
r=0
∑nr
i=1(pirs)
1−σ
µYs, r = 0, 1, 2. (3)
Equation (3) contains the spatial framework: there are R regions (R = 0, 1, 2), each of them
producing nr varieties of the manufacturing good. The price of each variety i produced in r and
sold in s contains the mill price and the transport cost: pirs = prTrs. We use Trs as a general
expression which represents either τ , ρ1 or ρ2. Using (2) and (3), we are thus able to derive the
following industrial price index for each region s:
Gs =
[
R∑
r=1
nr∑
i=1
(pirTrs)
1−σ
] 1
1−σ
(4)
Producers
Manufactured goods are produced in a monopolistically competitive industry, following the Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) framework. Each producer has the same production function, expressed in
terms of manufacturing labor. The total cost contains a fixed cost α and a marginal cost β per
additional unit produced:
li = α + βqi (5)
where li is the amount of labor used by each firm and qi represents its production. Each
producer maximizes his profits. As usual in the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model, we obtain
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constant mark-up equations:
pi,r =
(
σ
σ − 1
)
wrβ (6)
where wr is the manufacturing wage in region r. The equilibrium output of a firm producing
variety i in region r is derived from the free entry condition:
q∗i,r =
α(σ − 1)
β
(7)
and the equilibrium on the labor market allows us to obtain the equilibrium number of firms in
each region:
nr =
Lr
ασ
(8)
where Lr is the total number of manufacturing workers in region r.
Wage equations
Finally, using (3), (6), (7), (8) and the equilibrium on the goods market, we derive the manu-
facturing wage equation for each region r:
wr = β
(
σ − 1
σ
) µβ
α(σ − 1)

 R∑
j=1
YjG
σ−1
j T
1−σ
jr




1/σ
(9)
Equation (9) is a typical wage equation in new economic geography models (see Fujita, Krugman
and Venables, 1999), containing each region’s income (Yj), weighted by the accessibility of the
region’s demand, the transport costs (T 1−σjr ) and by an index of concentration (G
σ−1
j ).
Industrial workers migrate between the two domestic regions, according to the real wage
differential. The real industrial wage equation is composed of the nominal wage deflated by the
price index:
ωr =
wr
Gµr
(10)
We now have the principal equations defining the short-run equilibrium of the model at a point
in time. For a given allocation of industrial labor between the two domestic regions, and for
known parameter values α, β, σ and µ, we obtain instantaneous equilibrium wages and price
indexes (w1, w2, G0, G1, G2). If real wages differ across domestic regions, then migration will
make the allocation of industrial labor change over time in order to balance the differential. All
workers react in the same way to a real wage difference, therefore interregional movements of
workers occur at one go.
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The evolution of the spatial distribution of manufacturing towards a more or less asymmetric
configuration depends on the interaction of two types of effects: competition effects and demand
and cost linkage effects. On the one side, competition effects originate in the high competition
on the goods and factors markets that arise when the economy is agglomerated, thus giving
an incentive to firms to move to the domestic peripheral market in order to benefit from lower
competition on that market. On the other side, the cost and demand linkage effects encourage
firms and workers to locate near each other: a large number of workers brings a larger local
expenditure, enabling firms to pay higher nominal wages, and making the location more attrac-
tive for other workers and firms. A larger number of firms also implies more locally produced
varieties, a lower price index, and thus more consumers/workers.
Thus, when competition effects dominate demand and cost linkage effects, the industrial
sector will be equally distributed between the two regions. When demand and cost linkage effects
dominate competition effects, agglomeration will take place. Both domestic factors (internal
transport cost, ...) and international factors (external transport costs, foreign country’s size)
can influence the relative importance of competition effects or linkage effects. In this paper
we are interested in the evolution of these two effects, and thus, of the spatial distribution of
the domestic manufacturing sector when there is a foreign country in the picture. The next
section shows how the presence of a foreign country, thus additional demand but also additional
competition forces, impacts on the economic geography of the domestic country.
2.2 Increasing the foreign country’s size
Introducing a foreign country in a Krugman (1991)-type economic geography model brings
important changes in the forces involved in determining the final outcome. Figure (1) shows
the real wage difference curve ω1 − ω2 as a function of the share of manufacturing workers in
region 13. The curves are drawn for the same parameter values (interregional transport cost
τ = 2, both domestic cities having the same external transport cost ρ1 = ρ2 = 3) but for three
different sizes of the foreign country.
The real wage difference curve allows to see the impact of the relocation of one industrial
worker from one domestic region to the other on the real wage of the destination region. We first
note that, if the symmetric distribution of manufacturing workers is an equilibrium (ω1 = ω2), it
is not always a stable equilibrium: starting at λ = 0.5 and increasing the share of manufacturing
workers in region 1 can augment region 1 real wage or decrease it. The evolution of the region 1
real wage and thus, the final equilibrium configuration, will depend on the two types of effects
we introduced in section (2.1): competition effect and demand and cost linkage effects. Let’s
analyze figure (1) starting with the situation close to the autarky case, in which the domestic
country has a reduced access to a relatively small foreign country. The dotted curve represents
3Figure (1) is drawn for the following parameter values: σ = 5, β = 4/5, µ = 0.4, α = 0.4/5.
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Figure 1: Real wage difference for three different foreign country sizes
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the evolution of the interregional wage differential when the size of the foreign country relative
to that of the domestic country is L0L = 10. We observe that the wage differential is positive if λ
is less than 1/2, and negative if it is higher than 1/2: thus, the point where the wages are equal is
a stable equilibrium. The dashed curve is drawn for an intermediate size of the foreign country:
the latter is 23 times larger than the domestic country. We see that the symmetric distribution of
industrial workers is still an equilibrium, but that there are now four new equilibria, two of them
being polarized and stable, and the two others being unstable. Finally, the dark curve shows
the evolution of the interregional real wage difference when the domestic country is surrounded
by a huge foreign country of 40 times its size. Whatever value takes λ, the migration of one
additional worker from region 2 to region 1 will always augment the real wage in the destination
region, which means that the only stable equilibrium is the configuration where manufacturing
activity is agglomerated in one of the two regions.
What mechanisms explain the different reactions of the real wage difference to an increase of
the industrial labor force in one region? From figure (1) we understand that the size of the foreign
country has a significant impact on the linkage effects and the competition effects. Indeed, the
impact of the increase in L0 can be analyzed through the effects of its two components: foreign
demand effects and foreign competition effects. Both impact on the linkage effects and the
competition effects governing domestic agglomeration or dispersion. On the one side, having
an access to a large exterior market lowers the incentive for domestic firms to locate near
domestic consumers, which represent a smaller share of their sales. Thus the linkage effects
are weakened by the increase in L0; the foreign demand lowers the need to agglomerate near
domestic consumers. On the other side, the increase of the foreign country’s size also affects
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the competition effects within the domestic country, through the foreign competition effect.
The competition exerted by foreign firms on the domestic market is large compared to the
competition of other domestic firms. Therefore, the increase in L0 lowers the need for domestic
firms to locate far from domestic competitors, and thus lowers the need to disperse economic
activity.
In the present case, where both cities have the same access to the foreign market, the foreign
demand effect and the foreign competition effect lower both the incentive for domestic firms to
locate near domestic consumers and the incentive to locate far from domestic competitors. As
figure (1) illustrates, an increase in L0 diminishes both competition effects and linkage effects,
but has more impact on the competition effect. The demand and costs linkage effects end up
dominating the competition effects inside the domestic country, leading the industrial sector to
be agglomerated in one of the regions.
2.3 Reducing the international transport cost
Figure 2: Real wage difference for three different external transport costs
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Figure (2) displays the evolution of the interregional real wage difference as a function of the
amount of industrial workers located in region 1. The curves are drawn for the same parameter
values (τ = 2, L0/L = 10), but for three different values of the external transport cost ρ
4.
As stated before, in this section we consider that neither of the regions has an advantage in
exporting to the foreign country: thus, ρ1 and ρ2 are equal and vary together.
4The other parameter are the same as in figure (1): σ = 5, β = 4/5, µ = 0.4, α = 0.4/5.
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The dotted curve represents the real wage difference when the external transport cost is
ρ1 = ρ2 = 2.5. The only stable equilibrium is the symmetric equilibrium, with one half of the
industrial population located in each region. The dashed curve is drawn for a slightly lower
value of the external transport cost. We observe five equilibria, of which three are stable: the
symmetric equilibrium and the two asymmetric equilibria. Finally, the dark curve illustrates the
interregional real wage difference when the domestic country has an easy access to the foreign
market. There is only one stable equilibrium, which is the agglomerated configuration.
This section and the precedent section showed the mechanisms of the model and underlined
the main result: trade liberalization fosters agglomeration of the industrial sector in one of the
two domestic cities. This result contradicts Krugman and Livas’s (1996) result, which conclude
that trade liberalization leads to internal dispersion of economic activity.
Why do we obtain such differing results? The reason lies in the hypotheses leading to the
dispersion of the industrial sector. Krugman and Livas’s (1996) model describes the spatial
distribution of economic activity inside a domestic country opening to trade, with the typi-
cal mechanisms of a new economic geography model based on increasing returns to scale and
transport costs. Yet, their model contains a dispersion force which does not depend on the
external transport cost: the congestion costs in a city are commuting costs which only depend
on the size of the city, and are not affected by competition pressures arising when the region
opens to international trade. The force driving dispersion of activity in Krugman and Livas’s
model does not depend on the size of the foreign market, nor on the level of transport costs.
Therefore, when opening to trade, the domestic country undergoes a loosening of the incentives
for domestic firms to agglomerate near domestic consumers, but no change in the incentive to
locate far from domestic competitors. Krugman and Livas thus obtain a dispersed industrial
sector as a result of trade liberalization.
3 Pull- and Push-Effects of Trade Liberalization
We will now ask the same question in a lightly different situation: by letting the two external
transport costs differ, we suppose that one of the domestic cities has a better access to the
foreign markets. We want to know whether this will change the outcome found in the previous
section: will the domestic manufacturing sector end up agglomerating in one of the two regions,
and if it does, in which city will it agglomerate?
The two following figures illustrate the evolution of the interregional real wage difference as
a function of λ, the share of industrial workers in region 1, when a country in which the two
cities are not located at equal distance from the foreign market opens to trade. In figure (3),
we suppose the following external transport cost structure, where city 2 is located closer to the
border than city 1: ρ1 = 2.7, ρ2 = 2.3. The three curves are drawn for an internal transport cost
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Figure 3: Real wage difference when size of foreign country varies
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equal to τ = 25. In the same way as in the precedent section, we choose in figure (3) to let the size
of the foreign country vary. The dotted curve represents the interregional real wage difference
when the foreign country’s industrial population is 10 times the domestic industrial population.
The domestic country is slightly opened to trade, and the stable equilibrium appears when the
industrial activity is dispersed. The dashed and the dark curves represent the situations when
the country is confronted to a larger foreign market. At first glance we observe that the impact
of trade on the internal economic geography is similar to the one highlighted in section (2): the
real wage difference curve progressively changes direction to finally cross the equal wage line
with a positive slope, meaning that the stable equilibrium is the situation where the economy
is agglomerated in one of the two cities.
Nevertheless, there are two important elements to highlight in the outcomes predicted by
figure (3): first of all, the dotted curve, illustrating the stable dispersed equilibrium, crosses
the equal wage line at a point which is slightly higher than λ = 0.5, the point where the
industrial workforce is equally distributed. This underlines the fact that the situation in which
the economic activity is dispersed leaves a population advantage to the remote region. The
economy is overall dispersed but there is an asymmetry leading to more than fifty percent of
the industrial workers to be located in city 1. This phenomenon emerges because of the greater
influence of the foreign competition effect at the beginning of trade liberalization. When external
transport costs differ, the foreign competition effect not only lowers the need for domestic firms
to locate far from domestic competitors, but also increases their incentive to locate far from
5The other parameter are σ = 5, β = 4/5, µ = 0.4, α = 0.4/5.
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foreign competitors, thus pushing domestic firms inside the country towards the border opposite
to the foreign market.
The second element to observe in figure (3) concerns the dark curve: the dark curve crosses
the equal wage line at a point which is significantly higher than λ = 0.5. This means that
although agglomeration is the predicted outcome, it has, in this numerical simulation, more
chances to occur in city 2 than in city 1. The agglomeration of the industrial sector will occur in
city 2 if city 2 contains 20% or more of the industrial workers. In order for the industrial sector
to agglomerate in city 1, which is remote from the border, city 1 would need to be, before trade
liberalization, a particularly large industrial center holding more than 80% of the industrial
workers. To parallel the push-effect arising from high foreign competition at the beginning of
trade liberalization, we highlight the pull-effect arising here from increased trade liberalization.
Foreign demand effects dominate foreign competition effects: when external transport costs
differ, foreign demand effects not only lowers the need for domestic firms to agglomerate near
domestic demand, but also increases their incentive to locate close to foreign demand, thus
pulling firms towards the city that has the best access to the foreign market.
In order to see whether the outcome holds when holding the size of the foreign country
constant, we present in figure (4) the situation in which the external transport costs vary. The
external transport costs structure is as follows: ρ1 = 2.7 + tariff, ρ2 = 2.3 + tariff. City 2 is
Figure 4: Real wage difference curves when tariff varies
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thus located closer to the border than city 1. The external transport cost is composed of a fixed
element specific to each city, which can be understood as the distance to the border, and of a
common element, which is the element we let vary in order to represent trade liberalization.
As in figure (3), we observe that the more the country opens to foreign markets, the more
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industrial activity tends to agglomerate in one of the two regions. More, for a strong trade
liberalization (when tariff= 0), agglomeration is more likely to concentrate in the region that
has the best access to international markets. Thus, the model illustrates that either increasing
the foreign country’s size or lowering the external transport costs generate a reallocation of
ressources inside the domestic country which has two main characteristics: a push effect can
arise, meaning that competition exerted by foreign firms leads to a relocation of economic
activity in regions remote from foreign markets as a protection reaction. Nevertheless, the main
effect of trade liberalization is likely to be a pull-effect, suggesting that foreign demand attracts
domestic firms towards regions that have a good access to foreign markets.
4 Empirical evidence: Urban development patterns in Romania
The empirical literature focusing on the relation between trade and urban structure is mainly
concerned with the issue of the impact of an increase in trade on the degree of urban primacy.
Ades and Glaeser (1995) study evidence on 85 countries and find a negative relation between
trade and urban concentration. They conclude that the data corroborates Krugman and Livas’s
(1996) result according to which trade fosters dispersion of industry.
We argue that the relation which to look for in the data is more adequately posed by the
model we presented in section (2): trade liberalization is likely to bring several different industry
location configurations. These are all explained by the model, which takes into account the fact
that cities can be located differently with respect to the main foreign market. Overall, industrial
activity will tend to agglomerate close to the foreign markets, but it can happen that because
of a specific size advantage, for example, economic activity will locate in the remote city.
Hanson (2001) proposes to estimate such a relation: the analysis aims at verifying whether
the theoretical result, according to which trade tends to shift production towards regions with
low-cost access to foreign markets, applies to the case of the North-American integration process
between Mexico and the USA. Nevertheless, we argue that finding a movement of industries
from the inside of the country towards the border close to the foreign market doesn’t necessarily
validate Krugman and Livas’s (1996) results. The Mexican case, as well as the Romanian case,
on which our empirical work is based, give evidence of a shift of activity towards regions and
cities with low-cost access to foreign markets, but do not validate the theory according to which
trade liberalization automatically fosters dispersion of economic activity. Henderson (1999),
in studying the determinants of urban concentration in a sample of 80 to 100 countries, has
a moderate conclusion: the response of urban concentration to increased trade should depend
on whether the primate city is already titled towards international markets. According to
Henderson’s results, trade will increase urban primacy if the primate city is a port, otherwise it
will have the ”economic geography effect, i.e. to help hinterlands by opening up international
markets to them” (p. 25).
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Our approach in this paper is to not directly link trade to the degree of urban concentration
but to the geographical location of cities. The theoretical result arising from our model presented
in section (2) suggests that industrial activity will tend to locate in the city that has the best
access to foreign markets. We choose to estimate whether such movements of activity can be
found in countries opening up to trade such as the CEECs.
The perspective of the enlargement of the EU to the CEECs offers an very interesting frame-
work in which to study these issues. First, the CEECs are about to integrate a new economic
structure. All the CEECs signed the Europe Agreements, which provide a framework for their
gradual integration into the EU and are likely to generate new trade flows between the two
areas. Therefore, the current process of integration of the CEECs in the EU represents a ade-
quate natural empirical experiment on which to estimate the magnitude of the relocation effects
predicted by the traditional new economic geography models. Second, the CEECs undergo
significant changes in their trade patterns: Maurel and Cheikbossian (1997) mention that since
the dismantling of the COMECON in 1991, a rapid reorientation of the CEECs’ trade has taken
place. The intra-COMECON commercial relations fell abruptly and the CEECs have opened
their economies towards western countries and primarily to the EU. It seems therefore appropri-
ate to study each of these countries in the framework presented by a new economic geography
model analyzing the relation between trade liberalization and the location of industry inside a
country.
Romania, as all CEECs, undergoes a significant change in its trade patterns. Figure (5)
portrays Romanian exports and imports to and from western European countries in percentage
of GDP for the period 1988 to 19996. The figure shows that Romanian imports increased for the
whole period, with a peak around 1992 and a decrease in 1993. The weight of western European
goods in Romanian consumption thus rose significantly during the time period we study in our
sample. In the same way, exports to western Europe augmented consequently in percentage of
GDP, highlighting an increased participation of Romania in its commercial relations with the
EU and other European countries.
A second reason why Romania is a good candidate for our empirical work is its internal
geography. Indeed, Bucharest lies at the opposite of the western border: this specific location
of the main city will make any supposed movement of industry and population towards EU
markets more visible if industrial activity tends to leave the capital to locate in western regions.
Finally, Romania, as far as its economic situation is concerned, doesn’t bear the charac-
teristics of the perfect candidate for EU accession. Insufficient progress in adopting a market
economy, but also a location remote from EU’s core, are elements which let us expect relatively
high adjustment costs in terms of the country’s specialization patterns and production struc-
ture. The present work can thus be of some help in understanding the tendance followed by the
6The data comes from the CHELEM-CEPII database.
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Figure 5: Romania-Western Europe trade
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Romanian economy during the last ten years. Indeed, if pull-effects dominate push-effects, i.e.
if the outcomes display a pattern of urbanization concentrated in regions with a low-cost access
to EU markets, it could highlight a positive consequence of the deepening of the integration
process between Romania and the EU, giving evidence of the willingness and the readiness of
Romanian firms in trading with western European partners. As mentioned before, according to
the optimum currency area theory, the costs of EU accession for Romania in terms of production
adjustments should be lower the more the country’s economy shows marks of openness to the
core.
4.1 Specification and data
In the model we developed in section 2 and 3, in the same way as in new economic geography
models, industrial workers migrate towards regions with higher real wage. A region’s real wage
is defined, as illustrated by equation (10), as the ratio of the nominal wage on the industrial
price index. Therefore, an implication of the model would be to find, within Romania, signifi-
cant workforce and firms movements towards regions characterized by higher nominal wages -
equation (9)- and lower price indexes - equation (4). Accordingly, we want to estimate a relation
assessing whether during the last decade, any significant movement of population towards the
western cities, and thus, any increase in the degree of urbanization was to be seen in the regions
that have higher nominal wages and a good access to the EU markets: as we will explain in
this section, we use a computed market potential variable instead of the industrial price index,
because these two variables relate in significant ways.
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Urban development
Our measure of the increase of the degree of urbanization is based on annual regional population
data, divided among rural and urban population. We calculate regional urban balances, and
we express the share of urban population sur of a region r as the ratio of urban population to
total population. The annual growth rate of the ratio of urban population is then defined as
the difference of the logarithms.
Population data is provided by the Romanian Statistical Office. It consists of regional
population data for the years 1991 to 1998, separated in urban and rural population. Romanian
regions correspond to the Eurostat classification at the NUTS 3 level, which divide the country
in 41 entities, Bucharest and its suburbs being one region.
The geography of growing urban population is the following: regions whose share of urban
population increased between 1993 and 1997 are either the regions containing medium size
Romanian cities (RO054, Timisoara; RO063, Cluj) or western and southern border regions
(RO041, Dolj; RO061, Bihor).
Access to markets
The real wage, according to which industrial workers migrate, contains the nominal wage and
the price index. The price index of a region shows high similarity with its market potential,
which is a measure of access to markets typically used in new economic geography models. It
was first enunciated in a simple form by Harris (1954), as the distance-weighted sum of all other
region’s GDPs:
MP rt =
N∑
j=1
GDP jt
drj
(11)
where drs is the distance between region r and s.
It is thus possible to emphasize the similarity between the price index of a region and that
region’s market potential, according to Harris’s definition: both contain the distance weighted-
number of firms in each region. The closer region r is from an economic core, the higher is
its market potential, and the lower is its industrial price index. Thus, we compute the simple
market potential variable for each region from GDP and distance data and use it as a variable
explaining the urbanization patterns.
We choose to divide the market potential into three parts, corresponding to three different
markets: EU markets, CEECs’ markets (but Romania) and domestic Romanian market. As
emphasized earlier, regressing the urbanization patterns on the access to three different markets
is likely to highlight the dynamics underlying the reallocation of ressources in Romania. It will
allow to see whether Romania is reorienting its production structures towards western or central
European markets, or on the contrary if Romania is withdrawing to itself.
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GDP data come from the Eurostat Regio database. We use regional data for EU countries
and national data for CEECs. Distances are provided by an electronic road atlas.
We regress the urbanization growth rate on the three market potentials and on the following
variables: the wages and the unemployment rate, the share of agricultural employment in total
regional employment, and two dummies corresponding to port cities and to the capital city.
4.2 Results
Tables (1) and (2) present the estimation results. Both group of estimations are done using fixed
effects on the time dimension. This allows to take into account heterogeneity in urbanization
patterns arising from particular years. Thus, our coefficients only reflect heterogeneity in the
degree of regional urbanization resulting from spatial characteristics.
Table 1: Urban Growth in Romania 1993-1997 - OLS Fixed Effects
Dependent variable: Annual growth rate of share of urban population
All regions Bucharest dropped
Model ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 )
MP 0.0072 b - - 0.0073 b - -
(2.05) (2.04)
MP Romania - 0.0080 a 0.0076 a - 0.0080 a 0.0076 a
(2.96) (2.73) (2.95) (2.71)
MP EU - 0.0159 a - - 0.0159 a -
(3.49) (3.47)
MP CEECs - - 0.0078 a - - 0.0079 a
(3.02) (3.01)
Wages 0.0112 b 0.0108 b 0.0112 b 0.0115 b 0.0110 b 0.0115 b
(2.49) (2.44) (2.51) (2.51) (2.47) (2.54)
Unemp. Rate 0.0011 0.0015 0.0011 0.0011 0.0015 0.0011
(0.93) (1.25) (0.98) (0.92) (1.24) (0.97)
Share agri. 0.0047 a 0.0065 a 0.0061 a 0.0048 a 0.0066 a 0.0062 a
(2.94) (3.88) (3.65) (2.96) (3.89) (3.66)
Sea 0.0021 0.0055 b 0.0046 c 0.0021 0.0056 b 0.0046 c
(0.82) (2.02) (1.69) (0.83) (2.02) (1.69)
Bucharest 0.0061 0.0033 0.0027 - - -
(1.60) (0.86) (0.70)
Nb. Obs. 205 205 205 200 200 200
R2 0.3761 0.4038 0.3571 0.3786 0.3667 0.3973
t-student in parentheses - a, b and c indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level
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Table 1 displays estimation results for the 1993-1997 period. The four top rows display the
parameter estimates for the principal variable of interest: the access to markets. The first
column only contains the total market potential. It is positive and significative, but we note
that the coefficient on the market potential variable is higher when the variable is divided among
geographical regions: column (2) comprises results concerning the Romanian and the European
market potential, and column (3) for the Romanian and the CEECs market potential. In both
columns, the coefficients on the market potential are higher and more significative than in column
(1). More, there are differences among geographical areas: access to European markets seems
to have a stronger influence on Romanian urbanization patterns than access to the domestic
market. Concerning the CEECs, the influence is lower than that of European countries, but
we observe that it is still slightly higher than the influence of Romanian markets. Thus, trade
liberalization seems to give more weight to the proximity to European markets in Romanian
workforce location decisions. This is a positive finding with respect to the dynamics possibly
reshaping central and eastern European production structures: cities grow faster in regions that
have a good access to EU markets, and also, but in a weaker way, to CEECs markets.
The three last columns present estimation results obtained without taking into consideration
the Bucharest observation. We note that the results are unchanged: having a low-cost access
to European markets still appears to have the strongest influence on Romanian urbanization
patterns. Thus, it is interesting to note that the capital city doesn’t behave like a city which has
some advantage in foreign trade. More, Bucharest doesn’t seem to be an observation bringing
much information to the estimation, as emphasized by the non significative Bucharest dummy
variable in the first three columns. This variable is thus dropped in the next three columns.
The share of agricultural employment in total employment represents a dummy variable for
a region’s low density, or, alternatively, for low congestion costs. In all columns, the share of
agricultural employment is positive and significative. Everything equals, this means that the
more a region is agricultural, thus not very dense, the higher will be its urban growth rate. This
variable takes into account the fact that it is easier to have a high urban growth rate when there
is little urbanization at the beginning.
The Sea variable is a dummy representing regions that are likely to have a good access to
foreign markets because they contain or are located near a port city. This variable is rarely
significative, highlighting that a maritime location doesn’t constitute an important element in
favoring urban development.
Table (2) displays estimation results obtained by dividing the sample into three periods. We
still use fixed effects on the time dimension, in order to control for the heterogeneity arising
from different years. Our coefficients thus only contain a spatial dimension. Comparing them
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Table 2: Urban Growth in Romania by period - OLS Fixed Effects
Dependent variable: Annual growth rate of share of urban population - Bucharest dropped
1993-1995 1994-1996 1995-1997
MP Romania 0.0092 b 0.0081 c 0.0083 b 0.0084 b 0.0086 a 0.0088 a
(2.14) (1.84) (2.51) (2.44) (2.68) (2.65)
MP EU 0.0179 b - 0.0202 a - 0.0190 a -
(2.49) (3.62) (3.53)
MP CEECs - 0.0080 c - 0.0108 a - 0.0104 a
(1.96) (3.36) (3.32)
Wages 0.0071 0.0070 0.0130 b 0.0138 b 0.0141 a 0.0152 a
(0.95) (0.91) (2.45) (2.56) (2.79) (2.97)
Unemp. Rate 0.0008 0.0003 0.0014 0.0010 0.0010 0.0007
(0.39) (0.15) (1.02) (0.77) (0.81) (0.58)
Share agri. 0.0070 a 0.0063 b 0.0060 a 0.0057 a 0.0068 a 0.0066 a
(2.63) (2.38) (2.92) (2.77) (3.38) (3.27)
Sea 0.0050 0.0036 0.0070 b 0.0061 c 0.0080 a 0.0072 b
(1.17) (0.84) (2.07) (1.82) (2.44) (2.24)
Nb. Obs. 120 120 120 120 120 120
R2 0.4012 0.3890 0.4566 0.4485 0.4550 0.4487
t-student in parentheses - a, b and c indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level
among three different periods allows to assess whether proximity to a particular market has
become more influent on regional urbanization over the time period considered.
Observing the first column of each time period shows the evolution of the relative impor-
tance of Romanian and European markets in influencing Romanian urbanization patterns. The
Romanian market does appear to have some importance, as shown by the positive and signi-
ficative coefficients. Proximity to European countries is also positive and significative. We can
emphasize that over the three periods, European markets have a higher influence on Romanian
urbanization patterns than the domestic Romanian market, even if this relatively higher coef-
ficient doesn’t always increase from one period to another. The second column of each time
period illustrates the evolution of the coefficients on Romanian and CEECs’ market potential
variables. While both markets seem similarly important to Romanian location decisions during
the first period, we note that the CEECs take much more weight starting at the second period.
Nevertheless, the coefficient of the CEECs market potential never attain the value showed by
the European market potential.
The results displayed in table (2) stress interesting features characterizing Romanian ur-
banization patterns. First, the more the period is distant from 1991, the more proximity to all
markets affects Romanian workforce and firms location decisions. This may express the fact that
the Romanian production and location dynamics are slowly becoming independent of authori-
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tarian decisions. Second, the influence of foreign markets is always higher than that of domestic
markets, and, within foreign markets, European countries are the most influent. This reflects
location dynamics increasingly turned towards western markets, which is a positive conclusion
for analyses based on the optimum currency area argument.
5 Conclusion
The theoretical contribution of this paper is based on a simple extension of the original Krugman
(1991) new economic geography model to a two countries framework. Our theoretical model
shows that trade liberalization is likely to lead to the agglomeration of economic activity towards
regions that have a good access to foreign markets. Thus, unlike Krugman and Livas’s (1996)
conclusions, our results predict a domestic reallocation of ressources that depends on the internal
geography of the country opening to trade.
The Romanian process of trade liberalization towards the EU constitute our empirical appli-
cation. Estimation results display a positive relation between the degree of regional urbanization
and the proximity to western markets, highlighting workforce and production location dynamics
bending towards EU markets. While the Romanian case confirms our theoretical prediction, it
doesn’t constitute a sufficient experiment to assess the prevalence of our theoretical results. We
will need to work on a broader sample in order to emphasize the agglomeration of economic
activity towards regions with low-cost access to foreign markets, whatever the initial internal
geography may be.
Nevertheless, the Romanian case does bring interesting and positive conclusions with respect
to the Optimum Currency Area theory: the country’s internal dynamics appear to be definitely
tilted towards European markets, which stresses the visible consequences of the starting inte-
gration process. Romania seems likely to develop endogenously the adequate characteristics in
order to minimize the costs of fixing its exchange rate.
References
Ades A. and E. Glaeser, 1995, “Trade Circuses: Explaining Urban Giants”, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 110 (1): 195-227.
Alonso Villar O., 2001, “Large Metropolises in the Third World: an Explanation”, Urban
Studies, 38 (8): 1359-1371.
Alonso Villar O., 1999, “Spatial Distribution of Production and International Trade: a
note”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 29 (3): 371-380.
Dixit A. and J. Stiglitz, 1977, “Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diver-
sity”, American Economic Review, 67 (3): 297-308.
Fujita M., P. Krugman et A. Venables, 1999, The Spatial Economy, Cambridge, MIT
Press.
21
Hanson G., 2001, “US-Mexico Integration and Regional Economies: Evidence from Border-
City Pairs”, Journal of Urban Economics, 50 (2): 259-287.
Harris C., 1954, “The Market as a Factor in the Localization of Industry in the United
States”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 64: 315-348.
Henderson V., 1999, “The Effects of Urban Concentration on Economic Growth”, mimeo,
Brown University.
Henderson V., T. Lee and Y.J. Lee, 2001, “Scale Economies in Korea”, Journal of Urban
Economics, 49 (3):479-504.
Krugman P., 1991, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 99(3): 483-499.
Krugman P. and R. Livas Elizondo, 1996, “Trade Policy and Third World Metropolis”,
Journal of Development Economics, 49 (1): 137-150.
Krugman P. et A. J. Venables, 1995, Globalization and the Inequality of Nations, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 110(4): 857-880.
Maurel M. and Cheikbossian G., 1997, “The New Geography of Eastern European Trade”,
CEPR Discussion Paper n1580.
Mundell R.A., 1961, “The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas”, American Economic Re-
view, 51: 657-665.
Nitsch V., 2001, “Openness and Urban Concentration in Europe, 1870-1990”, HWWA Dis-
cussion Paper n121.
Puga D., 1998, “Urbanization patterns: European vs less developed countries”, Journal of
Regional Science, 38 (2): 231-252.
Venables A., 2000, “Cities and Trade: external trade and internal geography in developing
countries”, in S. Yusuf, S. Evenett and W. Wu (eds.), Local Dynamics in an Era of Glob-
alisation: 21st Century Catalysts for Developments, OUP and World Bank, Washington
DC.
22
